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Abstract 
“Back from the dead” is how international media today describes the Bank of Cyprus after its 
resolution. Although market perception and financial results are improving considerably, 
there is still a “nightmare haunting” BoC’s credibility and performance: the big scale of Non-
Performing Loans. The case narrative describes all the important facts during and after the 
turbulent crisis period as well as the actions of BoC’s CEO to overcome the bad debt problem 
and the hypothesis of the creation of a “bad bank”.  The teaching notes analyze the impact of 
NPLs’ problem and the options presented at the end of the case. 
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On October 22nd, 2013, Mr. Hourican faced his career’s challenge by becoming the new chief executive officer at 
Bank of Cyprus (BoC)1, which was going through a huge financial crisis at the time. In his words: it was “The 
opportunity to make a real difference not only for the bank but for the country as a whole is a significantly interesting 
challenge.” 2 
In March 2013, Cyprus’ banking system crashed, capital controls were imposed, banks were closed for two 
weeks, new laws were released enabling the split between the good and bad parts of the bank, and for the first time in 
the history of Cyprus, banks were recapitalized through a bail-in of uninsured deposits (see Exhibit 1 for a descriptive 
of bail-in amounts). Additionally, the two biggest banks in Cyprus – Bank of Cyprus and the Cyprus Popular Bank 
(also known as Laiki Bank) – limited the amount of money that the clients could withdraw daily or use in credit 
transactions. However, after asking to the Eurogroup, European Commission, European Central Bank, and 
International Monetary Fund for a rescue package of €10 billion, the Cypriot government had to close its second 
largest bank – the Laiki Bank.3 4 
As one of the island's largest financial institutions, the Bank of Cyprus suffered severely with the Cypriot financial 
crisis and consequently had to come up with heavy measures in order to restructure itself. Furthermore, the bank had 
announced a record volume of Non-Performing Loans (NPLs) of €14 billion in 2013. After the bailout agreement, 
John Hourican is now the one responsible for managing the bank during this turbulent transition. But how would he 
recover the confidence of key stakeholders? How can he get rid of the NPLs problem? 
2. Banking system in Cyprus 
After Cyprus’ Independence, the banking system of the country has grown a lot due to the fast expansion of the 
island (see Exhibits 2 and 3 for more information), the stiff competition among banks and the creation of the Central 
                                                 
1 Saigol, Lina. October 23rd  2013. “Hourican Faces Challenging Role at Bank of Cyprus”. Financial Times. 
https://www.ft.com/content/4caaa494-3bd2-11e3-b85f-00144feab7de> 
2 Schäfer, Daniel. October 22nd  2013. "Hourican to lead Bank of Cyprus." Financial Times. < https://www.ft.com/content/5fc4360e-3b59-
11e3-87fa-00144feab7de> 
3 Clerides, S. 2014. “The Collapse of the Cypriot Banking System : A Bird’s Eye View”. Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 8(2), 3–35. 
4 Orphanides, A. 2014. “What Happened in Cyprus? The Economic Consequences of the Last Communist Government in Europe”. Retrieved 
from http://ssrn.com/abstract=2432456 
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Bank of Cyprus. Banks went beyond the traditional retailing system by extending their activity to international trade 
finance, foreign currency accounts and other non-banking activities such as insurance or security investments.5 
Outstanding most of countries in Europe, Cyprus has become highly attractive to foreign investors, with 
assets representing more than 600% of Cyprus’ GDP in 2011-2013 (see Exhibit 4 for more key information about 
banking sector of Cyprus) creating in the long-term an unsustainable situation. 6Along with Luxembourg, Malta, 
Ireland, Great Britain, Denmark, France, and the Netherlands, Cyprus presented a proportion of assets to the GDP 
well above the European Union’s average of 370%.7 
In a general picture, the banking system was characterized by 5 main aspects.6 Most of the banks and financial 
institutions were detained by private investors. The commercial banking industry was considerably concentrated 
because of the size of small (in absolute terms) banks as a proportion of GDP. Regarding the top three banks of the 
island (Bank of Cyprus, Cyprus Popular Bank, and Hellenic Bank), all together they controlled 56% of the domestic 
deposits and 48% of domestic loans in March 2011. The same industry was highly profitable, when compared to 
similar banks in other European countries. The banking sector was highly saturated as it is shown in Exhibit 5,  in a 
population of 577 000 habitants, there were 1297 inhabitants per branch.8This fact did not allow the banks to expand 
themselves locally. For that reason, the three biggest banks of the island expanded their operations into Greece and to 
other global markets. Finally, there was substantial conduct regulation9 as the interest rates were not market determined 
and were subject to a percentage ceiling10. In Cyprus, the credit ceilings were imposed from time to time, and reserve 
requirements varied between 20 and 25 percent. Due to the financial stability and growth in the Cypriot economy, 
experienced before 2001, banks did not feel the need to invest in risk management and project appraisal becoming 
vulnerable to movements in global markets. 11 
                                                 
5 Phylaktis, Kate.1995. “The Banking System during Independence”. In Banking System of Cyprus: Past, Present and Future. Macmillan Press 
Ltd. : 76-83 
6 Central Bank of Cyprus 
7 European Banking Federation,.2012 
8 "Cyprus | Data." 2011-2013. World Bank Data. <http://data.worldbank.org/country/cyprus> 
9 It implies “direct restrictions on assets and liabilities (including prudential rules and rules on participation in non-banking firms), rules relating  to 
fees and commissions and interest rates on assets and liabilities. These regulations are expected to provide banks with an incentive to over-
emphasize competitive rules which are not restricted.”( Fulbright,Norton Rose. 2014.“Beyond law: understanding the scope of conduct 
regulation) 
10 The maximum interest rate that reduces the risk of a party not paying the interest and that might be charged on a contract. (Ceiling." The Free 
Dictionary. Farlex, n.d. . http://financial-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/ceiling) 
11Phylaktis, Kate.1995. “The Banking System during Independence”. In Banking System of Cyprus: Past, Present and Future. Macmillan Press 
Ltd. : 83-84 
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Banks established a significant subsidiary network leading to an over-banked, costly and inefficient system. 
Most of the foreign banks were not able and did not desire to work in this inconsistent and vulnerable banking system, 
and for that reason, the majority left Cyprus in the 1980s.10 When the financial crisis hit Cyprus, the banks suffered the 
negatively impact and were unable to defend themselves. Consequently, and for the first time in the history of Cyprus, 
the depositors had to pay for the country’s restructuring plan. The cuts reached a record scale which transformed the 
Cypriot economy completely.12 
Central Bank of Cyprus 
Formed in June of 1963, the Central Bank of Cyprus (CBC) came to support the financial development of 
Cyprus’ economy. To control the Cypriot monetary and banking system, the central bank was responsible for the 
bank supervision; regulation of money and credit supply; the management of the Republic’s international reserves and 
it was the official banker and financial agent that represented the government of Cyprus. Preceeding the crisis, the 
CBC’s reputation was quite good regarding its effectiveness and actions, free of political interference. By the time that 
crisis started to reveal its consequences, the CBC was getting more and more exposed. The Central Bank was accused 
of acting late and being confident when credit and property bubble affected the banking system. When the global crisis 
impacted the world economies brutally, the Central Bank decreased the constraints less than a year later.13 
                   Day after day, critics and concerns were raised, from local and global media as well as other international 
and local institutions, around the CBC’s inefficiencies and ethical problems. The detention of Greek government 
bonds (GGBs) was highly criticized, as the CBC and the Governor Orphanides did not try to stop the Cypriot banks 
from accumulating them. Even though banks did not have to ask for permission to acquire bonds, CBC should have 
requested for the gradually and discretely decrease of the exposure to Greek government bonds (see Exhibit 6) by the 
two major banks (Bank of Cyprus and Cyprus Popular Bank). In addition, the Central Bank of Cyprus permitted 
banks to not classify loans as non-performing if they were appropriately collateralized.14 
 
                                                 
12 Ibid 
13 Ibid 
14 Clerides, S. 2014. “The Collapse of the Cypriot Banking System : A Bird’s Eye View”. Cyprus Economic Policy Review, 8(2), 3–35. 
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Last but definitely not least, the Central Bank’s actions towards the two biggest banks on the island were the 
most controversial issue during the crisis. In one hand, the CBC did not oppose itself to the renewal of Bank of 
Cyprus’ Board where one of the biggest debtors of the bank became its chairman exactly when the real estate bubble 
was in full swing. Given the ideal standards of corporate governance, this inaction of the CBC was incomprehensible. 
On the other hand, the CBC provided Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) to the Cyprus Popular Bank which 
was already insolvent by the end of 2012. This measure was a strong violation of the European Central Bank’s rules 
which, when considered not solvent, prohibited financial institutions from receiving the ELA.15 
Adding to these issues, the inaction in multiple M&A operations performed by the Bank of Cyprus and the 
Laiki Bank, damaged the image of the CBC severely. All the inertia and errors of the CBC contributed or did not 
minimize the effects of the crisis. There were indeed some analysts that defended that the CBC was a sick institution 
and the treatment would not be quick.16 
3. Bank of Cyprus and John Hourican  
The Bank of Cyprus is headquartered in Nicosia, and it is the major financial institution in Cyprus. The banking 
group, which is supervised and regulated by the Central Bank of Cyprus, provides a wide range of financial products 
and services, mainly finance, investment banking, brokerage, fund management, retail and commercial banking. 
Founded in 1899, the Nicosia Savings Bank changed its name to Bank of Cyprus by the time it went public in 1912. 
In 1991, the bank opened the first subsidiary in Greece. By 2011, it had a notorious presence in Russia and Greece, 
much stronger than in Cyprus.1718 
For unfortunate reasons, this Cypriot bank was known for its recapitalization through a bail-in of uninsured 
deposits. Furthermore, it gained the vigorous assets of Laiki bank (Popular Bank) which was forced to shut down as a 
requirement of the International Monetary Fund and the European Union in order to provide a rescue for Cyprus. The 
second largest bank in Cyprus (Laiki Bank), was divided into two parts, the positive one that was merged into BoC 
and the negative one that includes, for example, old shares, uninsured deposits or bonds was kept within the 
                                                 
15 Ibid 
16 Ibid 
17 "Milestones from Our History." Welcome - Bank of Cyprus Group. <http://www.bankofcyprus.com/en-GB/who-we-
are/boc-at-a-glance/milestones-from-our-history/>. 
18 "Bank of Cyprus." Wikipedia. Wikimedia Foundation. 
<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bank_of_Cyprus#Deposits_tax_and_bailout_or_bailin>  
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bankrupted bank. Although the uninsured depositors turned to be the bigger stockholders of BoC with 81% of 
holding, they did not have the right to a seat on the board. Similarly to the Bank of Cyprus, the Laiki bank financed a 
lot of Greek companies before and during the financial crisis of 2012-2013. 
In 2012, the financial crisis of Greece and Cyprus obligated the BoC to cease the branches in Greece (See 
Exhibit 7) and in March 2013, the board of directors and the CEO were replaced. Simultaneously, the former leader 
of the Royal Bank of Scotland, the Irish banker John Patrick Hourican, was nominated Chief Executive Officer of the 
Bank of Cyprus.  His role implied a three to a five-year restructuring plan for the Bank (see Exhibit 8 for the 
professional profile of BoC’s CEO). 
4. Main risks of the bank of Cyprus 
It is a fact that the risk management practices within the banking system before the collapse of the Cypriot 
economy were not enough due to the stability and expansion of the banking industry. Nonetheless, the banks faced 
many types of risks, in the course of their operations, that can impact their business negatively, and the Bank of Cyprus 
(BoC) is not an exception. To protect itself from those risks, the Group had to hold regulatory capital against three 
main types of risks (accordingly to the Basel II regulation): the market risk, the credit risk, and the operational risk 
(including litigation risk) – (see Exhibit 9 for risk governance structure information).19 
Market risk  
From all the risks included within the market risk, the liquidity risk is undoubtedly the one that most affected 
the banks in Cyprus between 2012-2013. The liquidity risk is the hazard due to which the Group cannot entirely or 
instantly meet present and future installment commitments as and when they fall due. It therefore incorporates the 
likelihood that the Group may need to raise money at a higher cost or sell assets at discount. The minimum liquidity 
ratios – computed as the liquid assets to total deposits -  established by the Central Bank of Cyprus were 20% for the 
Euro and 70% for foreign currencies. In 2012-2013, the Bank of Cyprus’ liquidity ratios (see Exhibit 10) were very 
well below the minimums established due to accelerating economic crisis that affected Cyprus, Greece and other euro 
zone countries that provoked the decrease of the bond values, the outflow of the clients’ deposits and the bail-in. 
                                                 
19Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
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Credit Risk 
Following the restructure and recapitalization of the Bank of Cyprus, the Group applied stricter lending 
criteria and reduced the approval limits of various credit authorities considerably (see in Exhibits 11 and 12 credit 
exposure and quality of loans between 2012-2013). The Banking Law in Cyprus and the applicable directives of the 
Central Bank of Cyprus had imposed limitations to loan concentrations. For example, banks were not allowed to own 
loans over 25% of the shareholders’ value to a single client assemble. However, the Bank of Cyprus did not comply 
with this regulation on December 31st , 2012.20 
Operational Risk 
The historical deterioration of the Cypriot economy, political instability and the regulatory measures 
negatively impacted the bank’s operations and business which offered many challenges to operational risk 
management.  The year of 2013 was particularly challenging regarding operational risks. After the celebration of an 
agreement in March 2013 between the Eurogroup and the local government, IT-related operational hazards rose. This 
was due to the complexity and tight deadlines confronted with the emerging, timely and effective need of applying IT 
systems related to the Decrees issued by the Resolution Authority for the safeguard of bail-in of deposits and capital 
controls. Furthermore, the bank faced several operational issues daily due to the assimilation of the Laiki Bank’s 
operations.21 
5. Consequences to BoC and effects on stakeholders 
When the crisis hit the Cypriot economy, banks assumed their losses and failed massively. This situation 
caused a bank run and the establishment of capital controls, which was a violation of the principles on which the 
foundation of the Euro was based. As a result, the biggest lender on the island – the Bank of Cyprus – was in a delicate 
and monumental situation (see Exhibits 13, 14 and 15) 
The ongoing severe global recession, especially in Greece, led to impairment losses on loans and advances 
on Greek government bonds (see Exhibit 16 for more information about Greek government bonds’ impairments), 
also increasing the provisions of the same elements. In addition, as the Cypriot economic situation deteriorated, the 
                                                 
20 Ibid 
21 Ibid 
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deposit’s outflows were constant up until March 2013 (see Exhibit  17). The Eurosystem funding was only obtained 
in 2013. As the credit rating downgraded, the access to liquidity provided by other financial institutions was becoming 
difficult, and the bank relied heavily on the liquidity given by the European Central Bank and the Central Bank of 
Cyprus.22 
Subsequently to the bailout agreement with Troika, the Republic of Cyprus had to follow the agreed terms. 
Firstly, the Bank of Cyprus, as well as the Cyprus Popular Bank, were recapitalized through uninsured deposits. This 
factor completely mined the credibility of the banks and reduced credit availability. Secondly, with the order of closing 
the second largest lender in Cyprus (Cyprus Popular Bank), its operations were transferred to the Bank of Cyprus 
which increased the complexity and number of difficulties confronted by the BoC. 
The accumulation of bank deficiencies allied to the deep recession in Cyprus affected the profitability of the 
bank inevitably (see Exhibits 18, 19, 20, 21 and 22 for the financial statements of the bank in 2012-2014). During this 
period, the growth of the bank was constrained as it was forced to deleverage and support the taxes as well as other 
fiscal austerity measures. Additionally, the private sector’s activity slowed down significantly. By 31st December of 
2012, the BoC was not able to meet the minimum capital adequacy ratio imposed by the European institutions and 
presented a Tier 1 Capital ratio at 0.6% and negative Core Tier 1 capital ratio at -1.9% (see Exhibit 17).23 
BoC faced an aggregation of no leadership, a quarreling board, frightful results and loss of public confidence. 
In the interval of 2012-2013, the bank was at its most critical point, and it was said that BoC was on automatic pilot 
with no one taking charge or responsibility.24 
Inescapably all the BOC stakeholders were deeply affected, however, as revealed by the present CEO, John 
Hourican, three elements were deepened and some irreversibly affected by the banking system reform : “I would like 
to close by acknowledging how difficult the past year has been for our employees, our customers, and our 
shareholders. No one would have set out to create these conditions deliberately, and I ask for your support and 
                                                 
22 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
23 Ibid 
24 Cyprus Mail. November 3rd,  2016. "Our View: Public Desperately Needs Strong Leadership at BoC." Cyprus Mail. 
<http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/10/15/our-view-public-desperately-needs-strong-leadership-at-boc/>. 
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encouragement for our plans to restore this Group back to health and, in time, value.” John Hourican 25 
Employees 
With the necessary bank restructure, a number of branches in international and national territory were closed. 
Consequently, there were salary and staff reductions as well as the implementation of a voluntary retirement scheme 
(see Exhibit 23 for more detailed information). In the end, the salaries were cut by 30 percent, the staff costs reduced 
by approximately 34 percent, and around 24% of the employees were fired. 26Those who took the scheme did not 
have access to the bank accounts in which their funds were being kept. A significant amount of the voluntary funds 
was turned into shares, and the remaining amount was held in BoC accounts which were restricted to capital controls 
imposed.27 
 “We feel like we were psychologically blackmailed into leaving our jobs and on top of that we were deceived by the 
unions into thinking that our provident funds would not be touched,” said Panayiotis Parperis, 58, who worked at the 
BoC for 32 years.28 
Customers 
 Generally, the clients of BoC were segmented into Consumer Banking, Small and Medium Enterprises 
Banking and Corporate Banking in Cyprus (Exhibit 24) .These segments were applied to all services including loans 
across Cyprus, Greece, Romania, United Kingdom and Russia. All sectors were profoundly affected by the troubling 
Bank situation, and depositors were unprecedently harmed like no other, nor in other places or banking systems in the 
world.  
For a long time, people were told by Cypriot official authorities and by the European Union, that the haircut 
would never take place. When this threat became a reality, the foundation of banking and the customers’ confidence 
was lost overnight. The Cypriot government seized 47.5 percent of uninsured deposits (over 100 000€) to recapitalize 
                                                 
25 Hourican, J. . November 29th,2013. “Bank of Cyprus Group: Annual General Meeting”. Retrieved from Bank of Cyprus: 
www.bankofcyprus.com 
26Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
27 Psyllides, George. July 8th, 2013. "BoC Retirement Scheme Comes into Force." Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-
mail.com/2013/07/08/boc-retirement-scheme-comes-into-force/>. 
28 Press, Menelaos Hadjicostis Associated. July 29th, 2013. "Bank of Cyprus Depositors Lose 47.5% of Savings." USA 
Today. Gannett Satellite Information Network. <https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/business/2013/07/29/bank-of-
cyprus-depositors-lose-savings/2595837/>. 
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banks. Those clients have received equity in return, as they were not able to take their money out of the Bank of 
Cyprus given the strict rules imposed by Troika. One share was given for each €1 of deposits. Nonetheless, after 
relisting, the BoC’s shares were worth €0.24 which was only 0.6 times the bank’s book value. 29The depositors did 
not only see their savings being wiped out but they were obliged to hold debts based on their savings and co-
convertible bonds. Depositors that detained €100 000 in the Bank of Cyprus got shares in exchange for at least 37.5% 
of their uninsured deposits, and 22.5% more were inserted into a special fund with no interest, and that could see write-
offs additionally.30 
 With the crisis strengthening, a great deal of clients was failing to pay their loans which intensified the 
liquidity needs of the bank and provoked a significant reduction in lending. Furthermore, credit card transactions were 
limited to €5 000 a month; withdrawals were limited to €300 per day and travelers could only withdraw €1 000 in 
bank notes abroad. “You have many cases of companies that maybe could do things, but they cannot get credit.” Said 
Stavros Zenios, a nonexecutive member of the board of directors of the Central Bank of Cyprus.31 
Shareholders 
Older shareholders paid a disproportional price for the Cyprus’ bail-in once they lost a generous amount of 
money either through the deposits haircut and the inexistence of dividend, as the shares were diluted during the bail-in. 
Even so, the old shareholders incurred in a loss of 98.7% due to the reduction of share price from €12 to €0.20 from 
2007 to 2012.32 
 Throughout the time when the deposits suffered the haircut, depositors held 81% of the share capital of BoC 
which combined with the debt securities converted into ordinary shares represented less than 1% of the share capital of 
the bank. The old shareholders lost control with the creditors of the bank now framing the new shareholder base.33 
 
                                                 
29 Martin, Arnold. December 15th, 2014. "Bank of Cyprus Shares to Resume Trading." Financial Times. 
<https://www.ft.com/content/60320adc-847b-11e4-ba4f-00144feabdc0>. 
30 Stothard, Michael. March 30th, 2013. "Bank of Cyprus Haircut Could Be as Much as 60% - CNN.com." CNN. Cable 
News Network. <http://edition.cnn.com/2013/03/30/business/cyprus-haircut-ft/>. 
31 Ewing, Jack. March 16th, 2015.  "As Cyprus Recovers From Banking Crisis, Deep Scars Remain." The New York Times. 
The New York Times. <https://www.nytimes.com/2015/03/17/business/international/as-cyprus-recovers-from-banking-
crisis-deep-scars-remain.html?_r=0>. 
32 Cyprus Mail. November 11th, 2013. "BoC Shareholders Have Suffered Enough." Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-
mail.com/2013/08/17/boc-shareholders-have-suffered-enough/>. 
33 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
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As expected, protests, conflicts, and legal actions came in a hurry. Irini Karamanou, a former non-executive 
member of the bank’s board, raised her voice and contested next to the Supreme Court against the decision for the sale 
of the operations in Greece and the transference of Cyprus Popular Bank’s emergency liquidity. The accuser defended 
that the appointment of a temporary administrator for BoC was illegal as the bank was not bankrupt nor insolvent at 
that time. Therefore, all the decisions made at that moment were considered by Karamanou illegal.  34 
6.  New BoC? 
In order to overcome the gigantic crisis faced in 2012-2013, to rebuild the trust in the bank and support the 
Cypriot economy, BoC created a restructuring and recapitalization plan following the decision of Eurogroup. 
Consequently, BoC was able to solidify its position, strengthen its capital position, minimize the exposure to the Greek 
economy, have access to European Central Bank liquidity and remain privately owned.35 
Restructuring 
 By 2013, the restructuring costs totaled €21 million, €11 million related to the voluntary retirement scheme in 
Greece and €10 million relating to the preparation of the restructuring plan and the stress test exercise carried out by the 
Central Bank of Cyprus. 36 
The restructuring plan (see Exhibit 25) was considered “the bible” of how BoC must operate in the next five 
years however other major problems needed to be addressed and solved. This plan aimed to enable BoC to overcome 
its biggest problems and gradually normalize its performance. A specific medium and long-term targets, such as the 
compliance with the minimum capital adequacy requirements, were set by the Central Bank of Cyprus. BoC 
considered the achievement of a superior Core Tier 1 ratio more important than profitability, as it would shield the 
Bank against deeper shocks and eventually improve the bank’s credit rating, allowing the access to financial markets 
for funding in the medium and long term. 37 
 
                                                 
34 Hazou, Elias. October 14th, 2013. "Legal Challenge over BoC Restructuring." Cyprus Mail.<http://cyprus-
mail.com/2013/06/18/legal-challenge-over-boc-restructuring/>. 
35 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
36 Ibid 
37 Ibid 
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Recapitalization 
 The recapitalization process of the Bank was completed on 30 July 2013, through the bail-in of deposits. 
Through the absorption of losses, the holders of ordinary shares and debt securities (see Exhibit 26 for key 
information about debt securities) contributed to the recapitalization of BoC. 
 The Bank of Cyprus has issued equity to the Laiki Bank (Cyprus Popular Bank) for the acquisition of certain 
assets and liabilities (including insured deposits) in the context of the acquisition of the Laiki Bank’s operations. After 
the bail-in of deposits and the issuance of equity, the Bank was considered adequately capitalized.38The legacy of 
Cyprus Popular Bank holds around 18% of BoC’s share capital, the bail-in deposits owned 81% of the bank’s share 
capital and the ordinary shares, arising from the conversion of outstanding debt securities accounted for less than 1% of 
the bank’s share capital.39 
The hole of Non-Performing Loans 
In John Hourican’s perspective the issue of Non-Performing Loans was one of the most pressing issues at 
the bank:“This is an unprecedented situation that has happened to Cyprus and to the Bank of Cyprus, and I think that, 
while the problems are actually quite clear, the solutions are as of yet untested, and not clear to me given that I haven’t 
yet taken full possession of the job.”40 
The expansion strategy to other geographies was driven by the BoC’s risky lending policies, which 
potentiated the growth of Non-Performing Loans (Exhibit 27) and increased the riskiness of assets. In 2012, the Non-
Performing Loans ratio reached 23.7% compared to 10.2% in 2011. By the end of this year, the level of provisions for 
impairment of loans reached €3.7 billion. At the end of 2013, NPLs amounted €14 042 million, which represented 
53% of the gross loans (See Exhibits 28 and 29). In 2013, the NPL ratio was computed based on restructured loans 
that were due for less than 90 days (which represented 6% of gross loans) and loans as well as restructured loans that 
were due for more than 90 days (representing 47% of gross loans).  The bank reported record losses for 2012 that 
amounted €2.3 billion on a rush in Non-Performing Loans as recession decreased the probability of repayment of 
                                                 
38 Ibid 
39 Ibid 
40 Psyllides, George. December 30th, 2013. "Cyprus Lenders Eye Banks Overhaul, State Selloffs in Review." Cyprus Mail. 
<http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/10/29/cyprus-lenders-eye-banks-overhaul-state-selloffs-in-review/> 
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debts from clients.4142 
 “NPLs (Non-Performing Loans) in Cyprus are by far the worst in Europe. NPLs are the single largest impediment to 
not only the banking sector but the economy” John Hourican said.43 While defending that the state legislation should 
be urgently put in place to allow banks to address NPLs properly, Hourican said that it had been a recent stabilization, 
however, the CEO of the rival Hellenic Bank, Antonis Rouvas stated that it would not be possible to predict at what 
level the bad debts could stabilize.44 
The lenders of Cyprus considered that it is crucial to restructure the debt so that the Cypriot financial 
adjustment programme succeeds and the CEO of BoC defended, on March 26th, 2014 that : “Bank of Cyprus is 
reviewing its restructuring plans in a move that could result in billions of euros of its troubled assets being put into a 
“bad bank”.”45 
The bank hired HSBC Bank PLC to analyze BoC’s business plan and evaluate the feasibility of splitting 
itself into a good bank, with healthy loans backed by deposits, and a “bad bank”, with bad debt backed up by fresh 
funding. Through the creation of a “bad bank”, BoC would be able to continue its operations as before and get rid of 
troubled loans. This option was also taken into consideration in terms of the Cyprus’ bailout agreement with the 
European Union and the International Monetary Fund. On the other hand, the “bad bank” would be a separate legal 
entity that could not be qualified for the central bank funding as the Emergency liquidity (ELA) is only available for 
institutions which take deposits. Once an Asset Management Company is created, the designation of a deposit-taking 
institution is lost. For that reason, private investment – bonds or shares –  would be needed to finance the split of the 
Bank of Cyprus.46 “At the end of the day, funding will be what determines whether you can separate out your good 
bank and your not so good bank,” Hourican emphasized.47 
                                                 
41 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2012. 
42 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2013. 
43 Sinead, Kelly.March 16th, 2014. “Senior Bankers Call for Swift NPL Reforms.” Cyprus Mail. <https://cyprus-
mail.com/2014/05/16/senior-bankers-call-for-swift-npl-reforms/>. 
44 Noonan, Laura. March 30th, 2014. “‘Happily Ever After’ a Long Way off for Bank of Cyprus CEO.” Reuters. Thomson 
Reuters. <http://www.reuters.com/article/bankofcyprus-ceo-idUSL5N0MP1MD20140330> 
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BoC’s Board of Directors understood that to stabilize the bank, the Non-Performing Loans should be 
cleaned from the bank’s balance sheet. However, by the end of March in some people’s perspective, nothing relevant 
was done. “In our final report, we said that the bank needs to be separated from its toxic assets, which should be bought 
up by a “bad bank”. This was in October, and still nothing has been done.” commission member and former BoC 
senior manager Yiorgos Charalambous said.48 
7. Split the bank or not? 
So far everyone agreed that the NPLs needed to be significantly reduced and there were only four options on 
the table. First, the toxic assets could be transferred to a separate and legal Asset Management Company (“bad bank”) 
where the loans would be monitored and restructured/ worked out. Secondly, and given that the previous separation of 
an entity is not always possible, it could be viable to separate NPLs from the bank through the creation of a separate 
department of the bank. The third option would be keeping NPLs in the balance sheet and manage them along with 
bank’s operations. Although if the toxic loans deeply impact the bank activity negatively and if this is perceived by 
external participants, then the risk of keeping them on the balance sheet would increase heavily, as it can destroy the 
bank’s credibility. If the separation of NPLs is not immediately addressed and solved, then the process of rebuilding 
the trust and credibility of the investors and clients would take much longer, which takes us to the last option: 
bankruptcy. If the bank is in such a difficult situation with no perspectives about the future impact of this gigantic crisis, 
won’t it be less costly for the Cypriot government to pay for the secured deposits instead of recapitalizing a bank with 
so many problems? 
On the other hand, the head of the bank continued to defend that BoC is analyzing every option: “We have 
appointed HSBC to help us look at our overall corporate finance agenda including the entire structure of how the 
group is organized. (…)”Hourican told Reuters in an interview.49 Long discussions took place in the BoC board of 
directors’ meetings, but by March 2014 the question still does not have an answer: How the bank will manage its huge 
bad debt? Is it really too big to manage? 
                                                 
48 Anastasiou, Angelos. March 27th, 2014. “What Is a ‘“bad bank”’?” Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-
mail.com/2014/03/27/what-is-a-bad-bank/> 
49 Psyllides, George. March 26th  2014. “Bank of Cyprus Kicks off Review of Restructuring Plans.” Cyprus 
Mail.<http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/26/bank-of-cyprus-kicks-off-review-of-restructuring-plans/> 





Relevance of the case in analysis 
The aim of the case in analysis is to study the situation of a bank hit by a tremendous financial crisis and under 
fire, given the multiple pressures from all the stakeholders affected by its restructuring measures. Particularly, at the end of 
the case, the indecision of bank’s board of directors regarding the best way of managing and/or getting rid of bad debt is 
shown. If on one side, John Hourican (Bank of Cyprus’ CEO) defended that a “bad bank” should be created, on the other 
the board of directors thought of this idea as unacceptable, given the further losses that shareholders would have to 
support. The case will have a focus on banking system failures, the impact of a disproportional amount of bad debt and 
the best solution for a bank to manage it. For those reasons, this case can be analyzed in any course of Banking and some 
Corporate Finance courses. By solving this case, the students are expected to identify problems in the banking system of 
Cyprus and to understand the difficulty of making a decision about the separation of a bank into a good and bad part, as 
well as, explore financial benefits and practical issues from it. To reach the goals mentioned, a set of questions were 
formulated, as well as a suggested resolution. In the end, the decision made by the bank is presented in the Case Outcome 
Chapter. 
Proposed Case Analysis 
1. What caused the bankruptcy of the Bank of Cyprus? Did the bank manage the risks efficiently that it was exposed? 
There were many reasons for the collapse of the biggest lender on the island, although there were 6 that can be 
highlighted. In particular, the impairment losses of loans and advances  and of Greek government bonds (GGBs), the 
constant deposit outflows since March of 2013 (when the bailout agreement was accepted), the difficulty of accessing to 
liquidity provided by other financial institutions , the vast branch network on specific and risky locations such as Greece, 
Russia, Romania, among others (which was significantly reduced by the end of 2013 as Exhibit 7 shows), poor lending 
practices (managers’ lack of criteria in conceding credit and the CBC’s lack of lending restrictions referred in the case, 
were in the origin of default on loans) and the poor risk management adopted by the bank. Through Exhibit 1 of the 
Teaching Notes (TN1), some ratios from 2011-2014 were calculated to support the information presented above.  As 
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shown in Exhibit 6, and as referred in the case, the Bank of Cyprus invested heavily in Greek government bonds and 
most of those investments lost their value after Cyprus’ bailout.  With the information in Exhibits 16 and 19, the ratios of 
impairments and losses of GGBs to total impairments and provisions and impairments of GGBs to the Profit/Loss of the 
year (TN1) are computed and show the significant amount and impact of those losses in the financial performance of the 
bank.  After the haircut of 47.5% of the uninsured deposits, the increase of the deposits outflows was inevitable.  Between 
2012 and 2013, the customer deposits had the substantial decrease of 47% (as shown in Exhibit 17). The deposits were 
not permanent funds and once a considerable part was from the interbank market, almost 20% of the deposits were 
withdrawn quickly after the haircut. Furthermore, the total value of deposits for total liabilities decreased by 41.5% (See 
TN1).  Due to bad lending practices and while customers start to fail the payment of instalments, the percentage of NPLs 
to the gross loans increased by 10% from 2013-2014 (See TN1).  All the reasons were interconnected and they reveal the 
weaknesses of  the bank regarding the three main  risks  of  Basel II (Credit Risk, Market Risk, and Operational Risk). On 
the Credit Risk’s side, and as presented in Exhibits 11 and 12, the credit risk exposure increased suggestively between 
2013 and 2014 and subsequently the quality of the credit was affected meaningfully. Even so, the high levels of the ratio 
of risk weighted assets (associated with credit risk) to loans and advances (see TN1)   that reach a value above 1 in 
2013 revealed how badly the bank was managing credit risk. On the Market Risk’s side, the analysis is focused more 
on the liquidity risk as it is a critical one for a company in the financial sector. The  Loans to Deposits ratio (See TN1) have 
reached high levels in 2013 and 2014, demonstrating the inability of BoC  to comply with any unpredictable capital 
requirements. Through the analysis of the liquidity coverage ratio   and the capital ratios, it is clear that the bank did not pay 
attention to the vulnerability of its funds and did not build a solid liquidity fund against adversities such as a financial crisis.   
2. Evaluate the impact and size of Non-Performing Loans on the financial performance of BoC.  Should they be sold? 
Non-Performing Loans are the sum of borrowed money that is in default, or close to being in default, as it is overdue 
for at least 90 days. Once a loan is categorized as non-performing, the probability of it being repaid is substantially lower. 
Additionally, a stricter regulation related to this category of assets was applied in Cyprus, which was considered “foolish” 
by BoC’s CEO, as it established that if the proportion of Non-Performing Loans to the total loans of a customer is 
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superior to 20%, his/her total portfolio of loans is characterized as non-performing.50 In Exhibit 27, the graphic of the 
evolution of the volume of NPLs of BoC shows an increase of  around 200% in 2011-2014, which is impressing. 
To evaluate the impact and size of Non-Performing Loans on the balance sheet, some ratios based on the financial 
were computed. The values of the ratios in Exhibit 2 of the Teaching Notes (TN2) are presented for the periods of 
2013, the first semester of 2014 and the full year of 2014. The changes verified on the impact of NPLs, as well as the 
difference in numbers disclosure in short periods of time are given. Considering the ratios of Non-Performing Loans to 
gross loans and to total assets, it is verified that there is an increasing tendency for those ratios, which shows that the asset 
quality is being damaged, with percentage differences of around 13% in the first ratio. Finally, the NPLs to equity ratio 
shows that the value of equity is so residual that it cannot cover a quarter of the toxic assets. 
Given the previous analysis, it is possible to conclude that the sale of Non-Performing Loans is imperative to 
improve the bank’s financial performance and consequently, the BoC’s reputation as it has to be able to manage all its 
assets. Through the sale of those assets, the Bank of Cyprus will be able to improve its liquidity and capital adequacy 
positions, possibly gain from the disposal of NPLs (very unlikely), reduce their holding costs (for example, management 
costs), minimize future provisions and improve market perception due to the NPL’s proactive management. 
3. If a “bad bank” is created and the NPLs are transferred to this new entity, how would this division be done in 
accounting terms? 
In this question, the students are not expected to develop any complex model for the division of assets, liabilities, and 
equity of the bank, but to reflect on how this division can be done. First of all, it is necessary to define which data will be 
used. As the decision was discussed between March and July of 2014, the information used must be the one of the 
interim balance sheet. After that, it is necessary to identify the amount of NPLs in the balance sheet, as there is no accurate 
caption on the financial statements and the same are included in the caption of loans and advances to customers. By 
consulting Exhibit 29, it is possible to compute the percentage of NPLs to total gross loans, which is around 57%. 
                                                 
50 Psillides, Constantinos. November 30th, 2013. “CBC's Definition of NPLs Is 'foolish' and Will Prolong Recession, Says 
BoC CEO.” Cyprus Mail.<http://cyprus-mail.com/2013/11/30/cbcs-definition-of-npls-is-foolish-and-will-prolong-recession-
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Having that in mind, we calculate a volume of NPLs of €11 563 366.53 , which corresponds to 57% of €20 063 034(the 
total value of loans on the balance sheet). Following that, the captions of the balance sheet can be allocated to bigger 
groups: on the asset’s side the current assets, the NPLs, the other loans and the other assets are included, and on the capital 
side 5 main groups are considered: the equity, the customer deposits, the other senior liabilities, the subordinated liabilities 
and the other liabilities.  Through this division, it is easier to evaluate possible wipe outs. In this resolution, costs for 
establishing and running the “bad bank” are neglected for simplicity. When a “bad bank” entity is created, the probability 
of failing is high, and the good bank will get rid of the toxic assets. People will start to invest again, and the bank will be 
able to lend once more. The problem in the separation of a bank into a good and bad parts is the allocation of liabilities. In 
Exhibit 3 of the Teaching Notes (TN3), two options for possible approaches to this division are presented: both 
considered acceptable. In the option 1, the way this division could be made in a reasonable way is studied. In this option, 
around 34% of the total liabilities are transferred to the “bad bank”, which is not an official wipe out, but close. The good 
bank will keep the current assets and the other assets (with a total value of €11 016 553.47 ) because most of these assets 
are related to the bank’s operating activities. It also gets the better part of non-current assets (specifically the other loans 
that are not toxic), while the ““bad bank”” gets the Non-Performing Loans, where some impairments were already 
considered by the bank, and further provisions are expected. The customer deposits are kept as liabilities of the good bank 
as it is strongly capitalized and the deposits are safe. Most of them are uninsured, and the creation of a “bad bank” 
decreases the risk of a run to the bank for the deposits. As shown in Exhibit 3 of the Teaching Notes (TN3), 34% of 
total liabilities are transferred as well as the full amount of equity (as the shareholders should be the first to incur in losses) 
to the “bad bank” and consequently, the senior creditors must be the ones to receive their money back in first place that is 
why part of senior liabilities are kept in the good bank. The big question is: Which ones must be kept and which ones 
must be transferred or wiped out? According to the balance sheet and accounting rules, the priority must be placed on 
senior liabilities. The last option is based on finding separate financing for the “bad bank”. In this case, around €11 billion, 
through new capital by selling shares to new investors, through loans from the Central Bank of Cyprus (as there is little 
chance that private investing will support such a capital increase) or by converting some debt into equity. Furthermore, 
only €3 billion of senior liabilities will be kept so the rest of creditors will be wiped out. In either option, the “bad bank” is 
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thinly capitalized, and it can experience further declines in the values of the toxic assets. In that case, the bondholders will 
have to renegotiate the amounts of debt, or the “bad bank” will need to be reorganized. 51 
4. What are the main advantages and disadvantages of each option to overcome that problem? 
In order to manage and get rid of the bank’s bad debt four main options were proposed: the creation of a “bad bank”, 
the creation of a department within the bank to manage NPLs, keeping the NPLs on the balance sheet and managing it 
along with other bank operations and filed for bankruptcy. All of them present several pros and cons that will be 
discussed below. 
i) Creation of a “bad bank” 
The “bad bank” is a separate entity with a significant amount of bad debt (in the BoC’s case, Non-Performing 
Loans) at market price. So, this transaction implies the total transfer of toxic assets to the “bad bank” as well as some 
write-downs where shareholders and bondholders are the only ones that can lose money. The key purpose of this entity 
is the absorption of toxic assets and their sales at a discount, as well as the possible sale of any collateral for profit. After 
selling all of its assets, the “bad bank” ceases to exist, as so far few “bad bank” entities have either profited or broken 
even.52Given the brief description, some advantages can immediately rise from the creation of a “bad bank”. The burden 
of recovering the Non-Performing Loans is transferred to another entity (and the speed of recovery can increase 
substantially), it can improve BoC’s capital position (as there is a total removal of bad assets from the bank’s balance 
sheet and transfer of the risk associated with the same), the “bad bank” can be specialized in the recovery of bad loans (as 
this will be its main job), the “bad bank” will not confront conflicts of interest with bad assets counterparties, it will enable 
the management team of the good bank to focus on the business operations and other assets and to lower monitoring 
costs for investors as the transparency will increase, the information asymmetry will be reduced and the investors, 
shareholders, market and rating agencies perceptions of BoC over its core businesses will improve. 5354Besides the 
                                                 
51 Ibid 
52 Anastasiou, Angelos. March 27th, 2014. “What Is a “bad bank”?” Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-mail.com/2014/03/27/what-
is-a-bad-bank/> 
 53 Januar 27th,  2016. “What Are “bad bank”s? What Are Its Pros and Cons?” Quora. <https://www.quora.com/What-are-
bad-banks-What-are-its-pros-and-cons> 
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advantages presented, there are a lot of disadvantages associated with the creation of a “bad bank”. Given the significant 
pressure placed on the managers of those entities to obtain results, the same may not recover critical loans that are more 
difficult to recover and focus on easily recoverable loans. Also, the pressure may develop unethical ways of recovering 
NPLs and the unavailability of private investors to invest in these portfolios of loans. The value of the assets can be 
challenging to determine (long negotiations can result in additional write-downs or long-term opportunity costs), it 
requires the management of the shareholders’ expectations an ongoing basis and the “bad bank” creation is complex and 
costly (it requires entirely separate organizational structures and IT systems). 5556By separating the assets and liabilities as 
exposed in the previous question, the creditors would not be happy because they will hardly get paid back. The “bad 
bank” entity is not a bank legally so it cannot operate as a normal bank (it cannot concede loans, attract deposits, among 
other common transactions), so it cannot generate new assets to support and repay its debt.  Moreover, in the case of the 
Bank of Cyprus there is a bigger issue regarding the Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) which only covers deposit 
takers institutions and the creation of a “bad bank” would imply transferring part of this fund, in the form of short-term 
debt, to the Central Bank of  Cyprus as the bad part of the bank is not a deposit taker entity. 
ii) Creation of a n internal department 
The internal department of the bank would be responsible for managing NPLs as its only purpose, however, and 
contrarily to the “bad bank”, the toxic assets would be on the group’s balance sheet. The unique difference  from the third 
option resides on the creation of a task force to focus on the management of the bad debt. The main advantages of the 
creation of an internal department are the possible faster reduction of provisions related to Non-Performing Loans, the 
improvement of credit ratings as well as capital and debt markets perception (and consequently possible decrease of 
financing costs), the reestablishment of focus on business operations and strategy and the creation of a task force of 
managers that will be only responsible to recover Non - Performing Loans. 57On the other hand, there are also some 
                                                                                                                                                        
54 Brenna, Gabriel, Thomas Poppensieker, and Sebastian Schneider. December 2009. "Understanding the “bad bank”." 
McKinsey & Company. <http://www.mckinsey.com/industries/financial-services/our-insights/understanding-the-bad-bank> 
55Ibid 
56 Ibid 
57 Anastasiou, Angelos. March 29th, 2014. “Rehab Route for BoC's NPLs.” Cyprus Mail. <http://cyprus-
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disadvantages associated with this option. Mainly, the continuous pressure from the administration to obtain results, the 
fact that the results of the department will continue to influence the profits of the group (and this can demotivate the 
employees of the bank) and the uncertainty about the performance of the managers of the department as their motivation 
and qualifications are not as good as in other bank’s departments. 
iii) Keep NPLs on the balance sheet and manage it along with other bank operations 
This option comprehends the solution of the bank by the time of the case, which is managing NPLs within the 
bank without separating the bank's operations to manage the toxic assets properly.  By the time of the case, the bank is not 
being able to manage the big amount of NPLs that continue to impact negatively their financial performance and their 
reputation, so there no advantages associated with this option. Contrarily, the confidence and reputation of the bank will 
continue to be damaged ( in the case, there are quotes related to media and other stakeholders pressure and bad publicity 
to the bank’s actions), the managers will only focus on the recovery of good loans once they will gain more money with 
it, the commercials responsible for selling credits will not be good debt collectors once they are trained to attract clients and 
sell products and not charging them, to reach a break-even point and recover bad debt the bank will have to change credit 
conditions and increase interest rates which will reduce its competitiveness and given that the bank will focus on 
conceding more credit and not so much recover bad debt, it will potentially lose money (for example, by conceding a 
new credit of  €100 it can gain a spread of 2% but by recovering a bad debt of €100 already considered impaired it will 
gain €100). 
iv) Bankruptcy 
In the fourth option, the possibility of the bank filing for bankruptcy or simply go bankrupt is considered. This was 
not an option put on the table for BoC’s board of directors, however, it is important to analyze this possibility given the 
case in analysis and the critical situation of BoC, even after the resolution. Attending that the bank will possibly need the 
support of Cypriot government or of other governmental institutions, it is interesting to consider the benefits of this 
solution not only for the economy of Cyprus but for the bank itself. Nevertheless, it is important to emphasize that 
bankruptcy does not imply the cease of operations. In the case of the bank, the options would be to file for Chapter 7 
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(where some creditors are wiped out, and other assets are sold to pay the creditors) or Chapter 11 (that is available for 
businesses which want to continue its operations and reschedule the repayment of loans). 58The principal benefits of 
bankruptcy are the fact that unsecured debts (except for deposits) are automatically wiped out, the costs of bankruptcy are 
lower than the ones of bank recovery, and somehow the creditors are powerless to collect from the debtor.59 On the other 
hand, the bank can be obliged to sell some collaterals and assets to repay debt, and it will not have the right to tax loss 
deduction.60 
5. What is the best option for the Bank of Cyprus given its current situation?  
After analyzing the two previous questions, the students are expected to come to a conclusion based on the facts 
investigated previously. Given the advantages and disadvantages presented in question 6, it is possible to conclude that 
options 3 and 4 (keep the NPLs and do nothing and bankruptcy options) are not viable. Bankruptcy does not make sense 
at this point as the bank already applied so many measures and is expected to be recovered as it is the biggest lender on 
the island. If it goes bankrupt, this can deeply “hurt” the economy and Cyprus’ credibility as a safe financial center.  
Moreover, given the efforts made up to now and the progress verified, the NPLs are the most serious problem to be 
addressed. The option of doing nothing is unacceptable in the way that the NPLs need to be addressed appropriately. 
Therefore, by not allocating a team or department to manage the toxic assets, the managers will lose their focus, and it 
will be difficult to recover public interest and trust in the bank. Having all that in mind, it is now time to decide if the bank 
should be separated into good and “bad bank” entities or if an internal department should be created. In order to make this 
decision, computing the value creation of both options is suggested. Even though there are no market values to calculate 
value creation from traditional methods such as EVA; it is possible to calculate the value created by each option by 
exploring the frictions in the market as defended by Modigliani and Miller. According to the MM theory, it is not 
possible to create financial value if a company is separated in different slices, unless there are frictions in the market. 
These frictions can be tax benefits, regulatory requirements, among others. Moreover, it defends that with no corporate 
                                                 
58 Peavler, Rosemary. “Understanding the Different Types of Business Bankruptcy.” The Balance. 
<https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-business-bankruptcy-393017> 
59 “Bankruptcy: Advantages and Disadvantages.” Findlaw. <http://bankruptcy.findlaw.com/what-is-bankruptcy/pros-and-
cons-of-declaring-bankruptcy.html> 
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taxes the firm’s proportions of debt and equity does not matter. On the other hand and when considering tax benefits, the 
company with the greater portion of debt is more valuable because of the interest tax shield. 61In BoC’s particular case, it 
is interesting to explore value creation especially for old shareholders through three main factors: tax deductions of bad 
debt (and interest tax shield), credit rating improvement of liabilities and transference of value from shareholders to 
bondholders through new capital increases. Furthermore, it is possible to explore improvements in the capital adequacy 
ratio with and without the division of the bank. The computation of the values is presented in Exhibits 4, 5 , 6 and  7 of 
the Teaching Notes . In the case of tax deductions of bad debt and interest tax shield, if a “bad bank” is created almost 
none can add value to the company because the bad assets will be transferred to the “bad bank” and around 44% of 
liabilities too. According to Cyprus’ tax laws, provisions of bad debt can be deductible “if the taxpayer can evidently 
prove that sufficient steps were taken before hand to recover them”62 . In BoC’s case, the provisions amount reach the 
level of  €329.12 million. Considered the corporate tax of 12.6% in Cyprus, it is possible to compute tax deductions of 
the bad debt for the bank when it is not separated and none if it is. This is due to the fact that toxic assets are in the bad part 
of the bank and this part will not make profits. About the interest tax shield, the same referred before also happens to the 
liabilities that are transferred to the “bad bank”, so the tax deductions with the separation are bigger as shown in TN7. If 
the bank assets are divided, and the bad debt kept only in one entity, it is assumed a possible improvement in the credit 
rating of liabilities. With the information given it is possible to improve the accuracy of calculations. By consulting the 
Exhibit 26, detailed information about bonds issued (covered bonds and bonds guaranteed by the Cypriot government) 
is available and the price and the yield of the bonds, as well as the cost of debt are computed (see Exhibit 4 of the 
Teaching Notes (TN4)). As the financial theory defends, the relation between the yield of bonds and the credit rating is 
not linear because the rating downgrade or upgrade impacts directly the bond prices and yields.  Moreover, not all 
investors are up to buy a “junk” bond, given its high risk (sometimes the rewards associated with those bonds do not 
compensate the risk as the investor can easily lose all his/her money), it requires investment on some essential analytical 
skills., and it is not allowed in some countries. If the rating improves, then BoC’s credit risk decreases and the required rate 
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of return on the debt decreases as well. As shown in Exhibit 5 of the Teaching Notes (TN5), an improvement in credit 
rating from B163 to Baa164 and Baa365 respectively, corresponds to the reduction of the cost of the debt once the bonds 
are not considered “junk” anymore and the risk of default decreases and the bond markets do not require higher yields as 
before. Assuming that, 50% of the government bonds and 100% of covered bonds are kept in the good bank given its 
seniority, the average cost of debt is computed as shown in Exhibit 5 of the Teaching Notes (TN5). If the bank is not 
separated, the cost of debt will be equal to €86 732 thousands and €82 549 thousands if a “bad bank” entity is created. So, 
with bank separation into a good and bad entities, there is a value creation of  €4.18 million. Furthermore, if a “bad bank” 
is not created the government will impose a new capital increase.  Again, the losses will go over the old shareholders, and 
this transaction is considered a value loss from the value transference from former shareholders to creditors, as these last 
will receive money from the capital increase and the shareholders’ shares will be more devaluated. Considering the 
number of shares issued with the capital increase made on July 2014 (namely 4 166 667 shares) at a nominal price of 
€0.24 and considering the market share price of €2.9766 (February 3rd ,  2017)  it is possible to compute the value loss for 
shareholders if the bank is not separated. Finally, and making a proportion of risk weighted assets with and without the 
creation of the “bad bank” and considering the data of 2013 annual report, it is possible to determine that the capital 
adequacy ratio would be much better with the separation of the bank (see TN7). In conclusion, and observing the value 
creation through the separation of the bank (€24 million) and the non-separation (€60 million), the creation of an internal 
department is undoubtedly the more reasonable one as it offers greater tax deductions, the losses incurred through the 
process are not as significant as value created in the future and the cost of debt reduction due to the separation of liabilities 
is not significant as value created through tax deductions. Moreover, with the imposition of a new capital increase the 
capital adequacy ratio is expected to accomplish the regulatory requirements. 
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64 Global Credit Research. September 29th, 2015. “Moody’s upgrades Bank of Cyprus’ covered bond ratings to Baa3”. 
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The Case Outcome 
Up until the case’s date (May 2017), a lot has been made and said. Although, the volume of Non-Performing 
Loans have been reduced, they are still at an unacceptable level. (See Exhibit 8 of Teaching Notes (TN8)). On June of 
2014, the Bank of Cyprus was exploring the interest in a potential capital increase of at least €1 billion. According to the 
Cypriot media, a three-day ultimatum from the Governor of the Central Bank of Cyprus was sent to the bank’s board to 
raise at least €1 billion by August 8. Since he assumed the position of CEO, John Hourican was fighting and working on 
shoring up BoC’s capital and refocusing in Cypriot market by decreasing foreign branch network. 67On July of 2014, the 
Financial Times announced that the Non-Performing Loans had been shifted into an internal department responsible for 
running down, restructuring and selling the toxic assets. At the same time, some customers whose deposits were seized 
were selling the shares of the bank at a discount to recover part of the losses they had suffered. In the same month, the new 
investors agreed to buy all the €1 billion shares that were being sold by the bank. The proceeds from this sale were used to 
repay ELA (the Emergency Liquidity Assistance provided by Eurozone Central Banks). With the successful capital 
increase, the bank was able to pass the European stress tests and with the highest capital ratio of the sector of 14.9% (under 
the rules of Basel III). It additionally brought valuable names, for example Wilbur Ross and Josef Ackermann, onto the 
shareholder enlist and onto the board. 68In November of 2014, John Hourican referred that “the lender was at war with 
the circumstance, as the ratio of Non-Performing Loans remained “still unacceptable” even after stabilized.” At the 
shareholder’s meeting, the BoC’s CEO warned that by the end of the year the stockholders would continue to have to 
make a “delicate extraordinary effort” to face the extremely high levels of delays and toxic assets. 69By the end of the year 
2014, the Non-Performing Exposures (NPEs) represented 63% of gross loans (with a total value of €14 billion), and the 
provision coverage ratio was still in 34%.70 
                                                 
67 Arnold, Martin. June 3rd, 2014.  “Bank of Cyprus to Offload Lossmaking Russian Lender.” Financial Times. 
<https://www.ft.com/content/a1c336be-eb2a-11e3-9c8b-00144feabdc0> 
68 Arnold, Martin, and Kevin Hope. July 28th,  2014. “Bank of Cyprus to Raise €1bn through Share Sale.” Financial Times. 
<https://www.ft.com/content/dee5fd30-16a2-11e4-a5c7-00144feabdc0> 
69 Orphanides, Stelios. November 25th, 2014. “Hourican Tells Shareholders Bank of Cyprus Still at War with Circumstance 
(Update).” Cyprus Business Mail.<http://cyprusbusinessmail.com/?p=1034> 
70 Bank of Cyprus Annual Financial Report 2014.  
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Exhibit 1 - Descriptive of bail-in amounts 
	
Source : IMF(2013), page 13, Central Bank of Cyprus, Eurobank Research 
	
Exhibit 2 -  Economic growth and External Deficit 
	







Exhibit 3 - Evolution of credit demand and supply 
	





























€ '000 € '000 € '000
93 * 135 * 142 *
78 836 110 542 111 734
477,69% 618.01% 629.07%
9 9 11
5 012 2 342 1 624
5 5 5
10 705 13 026 19 528
16 16 16
5 214 7 230 6 351
3 3 3
9 283 15 173 10 677
75,26% 95.07% 96.21%
5,16% 15.25% 9.72%
3 632 5 406 6 064
12,92% 5.95% 7.70%
150** 125 106 **




1 366 1 334 914
15,31% 14.14% 19.50%
12 CIFs didn't send CRD calculations as they didn't 
commence activities.
(Please note that CIFs have 12 months from the date of their authorisation to 
start activities).
"No confidential information which competent authorities may receive in the course of their duties may be
divulged to any person or authority whatsoever, except in summary or collective form, such that individual credit
institutions cannot be identified, without prejudice to cases covered by criminal law. Accordingly, whenever the
disclosure of aggregate statistical data would result in a breach of confidentiality as determined by the national
competent authority, those data should not be disclosed."
* Number of credit institutions includes 100 Cooperative Credit Institutions, permanently affiliated, to the Cooperative
Central Bank Ltd which acts as a central body under article 3 of 
Directive 2006/48/EC.
** At 31/12/2011 106 CIFs were sending CRD calculations but the total number of authorised CIFs was 
118.**At 31/12/2013 146 CIFs were sending CRD calculations but the total number of authorised CIFs was
Total capital requirements
Total capital adequacy ratio
Number and size of foreign credit institutions in EU countries
Total capital and capital requirements of credit institutions in EU
countries
Number and size of investment firms in EU countries




Total assets per GDP
T tal tier I capital as % of total capital
Total tier II capital as % of total capital
T tal tier I capital as % of total capital
Total tier II capital as % of total capital
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Total assets of branches
Number of subsidiaries
Total assets of subsidiaries
From third countries Number of branches
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National Data on Banking Sector
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Exhibit 5 – Cyprus Domestic Banking Market Share 




Source: Central Bank Of Cyprus 
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Exhibit 7 – Number of Branches Bank of Cyprus 
 
 Source: Extraordinary General Meeting presentation, John Hourican, 28th August 2014 
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Exhibit 9 – Risk Management Governance 
	













Exhibit 10 – BoC Group’s Liquidity Ratios 
	
Source: BoC's Annual Report of 2013 
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Exhibit 11 – BoC’s credit risk exposure 
 























Exhibit 13 – ELA/ECB funding (2013-2014) 
	
Source: Extraordinary General Meeting presentation, John Hourican, 28th August 2014 
Exhibit 14 – Profit After tax (2012-2014) 
 
Source: Extraordinary General Meeting presentation, John Hourican, 28th August 2014 









Source: Extraordinary General Meeting presentation, John Hourican, 28th August 2014 
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Exhibit 16 – Greek government bonds’ impairments of Bank of Cyprus 2012-2013 
 
Source: Annual Financial Report of Bank of Cyprus in 2012 
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Exhibit 17 – Key Balance Sheet Figures and ratios  
 
 
Source: Annual Financial Report Bank of Cyprus in 2013 
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Exhibit 18 – BoC’s Balance Sheet (2012-2014) 
	





Assets €000 €000 €000
Cash	and	balances	with	central	Banks	 668	292												 550	740								 1	272	424				
Placements	with	banks 1	462	824								 1	064	654				 1	768	836				
Derivative	financial	assets 62	585														 28	723										 26	794									
Investments	 1	831	297								 2	722	328				 1	135	333				
Investments	pleged	as	collateral 669	786												 672	809								 734	747							
Loans	and	advances	to	costumers 17	329	208						 19	714	705		 24	374	531		
Balances	with	group	companies 809	959												 1	115	708				










Total	assets 24	411	147						 27	682	169		 31	032	036		
Amounts	due	to	banks 159	765 124	152 341	044
Funding	from	central	banks	 8	283	773 10	956	277
Repurchase	agreements 579	682 594	004 607	773
Derivative	financial	liabilities 71	761 83	957 183	826
Customer	deposits 11	329	157 12	745	743 28	442	152
Balances	with	group	companies 550	683 563	579
Other	liabilities 283	735 132	966 1	076	767
Debt	securities	in	issue 693 674 44	775
Deferred	tax	liabilities 23	219 21	983
Total	liabilities 21	282	468 25	223	335 30	696	337




Revaluation	and	other	reserves 5	506 43	086 106	336
Accumulated	losses -273	281 -2	327	159 -2	500	106
Total	equity 3	128	679 2	458	834 335	699






Exhibit 19 – BoC’s Income Statement (2012-2014) 
	
	




Turnover 1	513	037 1	552	541 2	428	817
Interest	Income 1	383	355 1	416	319 1	992	228
Interest	Expense -374	057 -533	985 -981	110
Net	Interest	Income 1	009	298 882	334 1	011	118
Fee	and	comission	income 143	596 141	051 238	253
Fee	and	comission	expense -7	838 -18	941 -19	486





Other	Income/Expenses -19	591 -14	384 44	164
1	344	087 1	067	852 1	357	131
Staff	costs -203	844 -348	695 -408	347













Loss	before	share	of	profit	of	associates -290	214 -753	238 -2	210	162
Share	of	profit/loss	of	associates 222
Loss	before	tax	from	continuing	operations -290	214 -753	238 -2	209	940
Tax -357 4	911 -13	079
Loss	after	tax	from	continuing	operations -290	571 -748	327 -2	223	019
Profit/loss	after	tax	from	discontinued	operations 36	000 -1	327	603







Exhibit 20 – BoC’s Cash Flows Statement (2013-2014) 
	
	





























































































































Exhibit 23 – Staff Costs (2012-2013) 
	















Exhibit 25 – Restructuring Plan’s actions  
	
The restructuring plan focused on four major actions, namely: 
• The sale of subsidiaries: given the capital needs and after the review of strategic 
alternatives the group decided to sale some of its subsidiaries and decrease its exposure 
in multiple geographies. 
• 	Merge with the Cyprus Popular Bank and acquisition of certain of its operations: the 
insured deposits as well as the loans and the majority of Laiki Bank were acquired by 
BoC. As a result, all Laiki’s customers and employees were transferred to the biggest 
lender in Cyprus. 
• The sale of operations of the Group in Greece to Piraeus Bank: on 26 March 2013, the 
bank sold the deposits, the fixed assets and the loans of the banking and leasing operations 
in Greece to Piraeus Bank. Due to the discontinuation of the operations and disposal of 
its branches in Greece, the BoC posted a net loss of  €1.94	billion. 
• Changes in the Governance of the Bank: on 2 9 March 2013, all the member of the Board 
of Directors resigned collectively as well as the CEO and the Deputy CEO.  On October 
2013, John Hourican was nominated as new CEO and the Board believed that “the new 
CEO is a key step in the implementation of the restructuring development of the bank’s 
activities”. 
Source: Annual Financial Report of the Bank of Cyprus in 2014 













1.	Short-term	commercial	paper 1	000	000		 N/A N/A 364	days 31/12/13 N/A
2.	Covered	Bonds 1	000	000		 3,53% Quarterly 12/06/17 31/12/11 B1




Source: Annual Financial Report of Bank of Cyprus in 2013 
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Source: Extraordinary General Meeting presentation, John Hourican, 28th August 2014 
	
















































Exhibit 29 – Non-Performing Loans detailed information June 2014  
 




Appendix - Teaching Notes 
	
Exhibit 1 (TN1) – Key ratios in 2011-2014 
Table 1 - Ratios Computation 
 
 
Exhibit 2 (TN2) – NPLs’ ratio analysis 
	








Ratios 2014 2013 2012 2011
Impairments	on	GGBs	to	total	impairments	and	provisions 5,11% 80,2%
Impairments	on	GGBs	to	profit/loss	before	tax 6,50% ######
Deposits/Total	Liabilities 53,23% 50,53% 92,66% 84,41%
NPL/Gross	loans 63% 53%
Loan/Deposits 1,53 1,55 0,86 0,92
Risk	Weighted	Assets(credit	risk)/	Loans	and	Advancesto	customers 1,03 0,79 0,82
Captions	(values	in	thousands) 31/12/14 31/06/2014 2013
NPL 14	960	849	€	 14	042	069	€				 	 14	042	069	€					 	
Provisions	on	NPLs 3	071	954	€				 3	071	954	€						 	 3	076	270	€							 	
Total	Loans 23	772	112	€	 20	063	034	€				 	 26	743	320	€					 	
Total	Debt 23	308	000	€	 25	744	239	€				 	 27	612	000	€					 	
Total	Assets 26	789	000	€	 28	558	164	€				 	 30	349	000	€					 	
Total	Equity 3	466	000	€				 2	813	925	€						 	 2	663	000	€							 	
Ratios
NPL/	Total	debt	 0,642 0,545 0,509
NPL/	Total	Loans 0,629 0,700 0,525
NPL/Total	Assets 0,558 0,492 0,463
NPL/Equity	 4,316 4,990 5,273





Exhibit 3 (TN3) –  Accounting Separation Good Bank/Bad Bank 
	
i) BoC’s resumed interim Balance Sheet (30/06/2014) 
BoC		
Assets	 Equity	+	Debt	
Current	Assets	 	5	978	244,00	€		 Equity	 	2	813	925,00	€		
NPLs	 	11	563	366,53	€		 Customer	Deposits	 	13	802	750,00	€		
Other		gross	loans	 	8	499	667,47	€		 Other	Senior	liabilities	 	10	403	760,00	€		
Other	assets	 	2	516	886,00	€		 Subordinated	liabilities	 	674	779,00	€		
		 		 Other	liabilities	 	862	950,00	€		
Total	 	28	558	164,00	€		 Total	 	28	558	164,00	€		
 
Values in thousands € 
	
 
ii) Option 1 – Separation of Assets and Liabilities 
Good	Bank	
Assets	 Equity	+	Debt	
Current	Assets	 	5	978	244,00	€		 Customer	Deposits	 	13	802	750,00	€		
Other		gross	loans	 	8	499	667,47	€		 Other	Senior	liabilities	 	3	192	047,47	€		
Other	assets	 	2	516	886,00	€		 	 		
		 		 	 		
		 		 	 		
Total	 	16	994	797,47	€		 Total	 	16	994	797,47	€		
	    
Bad	Bank	
Assets	 Equity	+	Debt	
NPLs	 	11	563	366,53	€		 Other	Senior	liabilities	 	7	211	712,53	€		
		 		 Subordinated	liabilities	 	674	779,00	€		
		 		 Other	liabilities	 	862	950,00	€		
		 		 Equity	 	2	813	925,00	€		
Total	 	11	563	366,53	€		 Total	 	11	563	366,53	€		






iii) Option 2 – Separation of Assets and Liabilities 
Good	Bank	
Assets	 Equity	+	Debt	
Current	Assets	 	5	978	244,00	€		 Customer	Deposits	 	13	802	750,00	€		
Other		gross	loans	 	8	499	667,47	€		 Other	Senior	Liabilities	 	3	192	047,47	€		
Other	assets	 	2	516	886,00	€		 	 		
		 		 	 		
		 		 	 		
Total	 	16	994	797,47	€		 Total	 	16	994	797,47	€		
	    
Bad	Bank	
Assets	 Equity	+	Debt	
NPLs	 	11	563	366,53	€		 New	Capital	 	11	563	366,53	€		
		 		 	 		
		 		 	 		
		 		 	 		
		 		 	 		
Total	 	11	563	366,53	€		 Total	 	11	563	366,53	€		
Values in thousands  

















Note 1: In option 2 (Separation), all covered bonds and 50% of government bonds have a 
cost of debt computed in the table before for the rating Baa. The rest of bonds and the bonds 
of option 1(Non-separation) have the cost of debt correspondent to rating B1, once they are 
junk bonds. 
Note 2: Yield-to-Maturity (Baa) obtained in https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DBAA. 
	



















2.	Covered	Bonds 4,92% 4,30% 4,58% 4,00%
3.	Bonds	guaranteed	by	government 5,00% 4,37% 4,73% 4,13%
Cost of Debt =  YTM x (1-12.6%)
Separation Non-Separation Separation Non-Separation
2.	Covered	Bonds 4,00% 4,30% 40	029,20	€				 	 43	032,50	€			 	
3.	Bonds	guaranteed	by	government 4,25% 4,37% 42	520,10	€				 	 43	700,00	€			 	







Table 3 - Debt Securities' key data 
Table 4 - Cost of Debt 
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Exhibit 7 (TN7) – Summary of Value Creation 
	
Table 5 - Metrics to compute value creation 
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Source: Financial Times 
